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STATEMENT ON OUR CHANGING MISSION
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

In order to place in perspective and provide context for the kaleidoscope of changes occurring in our professional life, the Intelligence Directorate's Corporate Board has produced this memorandum. It encourages its use as a basis for dialogue throughout the Directorate's Offices, Centers, and Staffs.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar global power structure has changed the intelligence world immeasurably. It has resulted in a different set of demands in an era of budget cuts and personnel downsizing. All of this is occurring despite our continuing, and in many cases expanding, responsibilities for covering intelligence problems around the world.

Events that are playing out across the globe--from Bosnia and Somalia to South Africa, from the Middle East to Cuba, China and the former Soviet Union--involve, or have the potential to involve, massive societal changes over which leaders have far less control than in the past. Our analytical world is also being influenced by an environment in which instantaneous mass media bring wars, revolutions, and societal calamities to a global audience with an immediacy and emotional impact never known before.

The Administration is looking to us on a daily basis for critical intelligence support for both the crafting and carrying out of policy for the new era. Transnational issues such as terrorism, sanctions monitoring, proliferation, narcotics trafficking, and threats to peacekeeping forces are demanding more immediate attention. Our support to law enforcement entities has become a responsibility to an extent not known before. Tactical, tailored, and actionable intelligence has surged to the forefront of what the customer needs from us. The circumstances demand changes in the way we do our business.

Our mix of product has already changed. To a greater extent than before, it is being delivered through sharply focused serial publications, oral briefings, briefing notes, phone conversations, support cables, tactical action reports, and traveling support teams and officers. The Intelligence Research Papers and Intelligence Memorandums continue to represent our intellectual capital, laying out the data and analysis that we will draw on in the months and years ahead. Indeed, they provide the foundation upon which our more focused and tailored product is based. The changing product mix will have implications

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for performance evaluation. Our Office and Division level management will bear the responsibility for seeing that we appropriately reward those involved in producing and supporting this growing diversity of product. In doing this, one constant will remain. The quality and sophistication of analysis or support, coupled with the ability to bring intelligence value added, will be a key driver in career progression.

As the demands for intelligence have grown and become more consumer specific, we have, by necessity, begun to change the way we manage and process our product. We are now reducing management structure, removing layers of review, and relying heavily on our solid and experienced corps of analysts and managers. We have eliminated 25 percent of management positions at division level or above. Fewer than 10 percent of papers are now reviewed at the Directorate level. We give briefings by the hundreds to the Executive and Legislative branches without prior review above, or frequently at, the Office level. Our Offices and Centers publish over 20 serial publications on their own desktop facilities and then speed them directly--frequently by secure fax--to the consumer. A number of these are not signed off above the division level. Tactical Action Reports are put together, faxed out the same day, and frequently acted on by the Administration.

As the responsibility of all our employees increases, there are two imperatives which must be kept in focus. One is responsibility for quality work. The other is the importance of timeliness. For its part, quality involves a number of dimensions from the use of evidence and the clarity of assumptions to the need to work effectively across bureaucratic boundaries. The decentralizing of the process of production and delivery of our product demands greater rigor at the analyst and branch level and continuing up the line. We must be systematic in laying out the evidentiary basis of our conclusions. Every critical judgment must be preceded (or immediately followed, depending on the product) by the evidentiary base. This not only will enhance the consumers' confidence in our analysis, but also let them know that they are getting more than just our opinion as opposed to someone else's. It will also enforce more rigor in our own thinking and lead to better analysis. It will help us to clarify in our own minds what we have been told, what we assume, and what we have concluded. This approach needs to be a bedrock of our training and review process.

We need to place greater emphasis on clarity of argumentation in order to provide confidence in our predictive intelligence. The policymakers must see clearly the premises on which our conclusions are based. They must know which premises, if changed, would change our fundamental analytic conclusion and what this would mean for US policy considerations. This will also help to inculcate increased rigor in our own analysis. If these premises, or "linchpins," are made clear in our own minds as well as the consumers', we can then provide warning or alert

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memorandums or analyses when one of the critical premises changes. This tells the policymaker that it is time to get concerned and lessens the likelihood of intelligence failure. Egypt is a case in point. Perhaps the most critical premise is that the radicals have not begun to erode Mubarak's security services and armed forces. We have let the policymaker know that and must immediately let him know when and if there is reason to begin doubting this "linchpin" premise.

We must fix in our minds what is the prerogative of intelligence and what is the prerogative of the policymaker. Those involved in the great arms control controversies of the past learned the difference between monitoring and verification, sometimes painfully. We monitor. The policymaker verifies. Intelligence does not verify the honoring of treaties. It monitors suspicious or ambiguous activity and presents it to the policymaker to make the interpretation on treaty compliance or non-compliance. By the same token, we do not catalogue unfair business practices or competition. We catalogue suspicious business practices and competition and the policymaker determines the fairness. This also needs to be stressed as part of our training and corporate ethic.

A commitment to quality also means drawing on the full range of analytical, collection, and support talent available. With less vertical oversight there needs to be more horizontal consultation in order to achieve accuracy and comprehensiveness. Our interoffice and interagency task forces and centers have demonstrated their worth but the effort has to be constant and intense outside these formal structures as well. Briefing teams on critical issues more often than not should be drawn from across Office and Center lines.

The implications also extend across Directorate lines. Given the increased need for tactical, actionable intelligence, it has become even more imperative for us to work closely and productively with the collectors. This interaction must be as intense as it is with our consumers. Interdirector task forces or working groups to deal with thorny intelligence issues will have our fullest support. Analyst exchanges or joint staffing with collection organizations such as NSA will provide us insights and contacts that will increase both the speed and the value of input into our analytical product.

From a quality perspective, our ultimate objectives are to increase steadily the precision and relevance of our product to the consumer. The policymaker's confidence in and satisfaction with our work will be the measure of our success. This does not mean shrinking from the delivery of unwelcome news or analysis. Over time, our greatest assistance to the policymaker is delivering the most trenchant and accurate information possible, wherever it may lead.

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While quality is an imperative, so too is timeliness. A quality product which is delivered late negates the collection, analytical, and support effort that went into its creation. From the consumer side, it also calls into question our reliability. In many ways, the decentralization of our production has the side benefit of speeding the delivery of our work to the policymaker. Our intelligence is now being produced faster and getting to the policymaker quicker than ever before. In addition, our more decentralized production teams are increasingly taking advantage of new technologies. Our growing use of secure faxes and extensive Office use of desktop publishing, for instance, are examples of our investment in the technical part of this process.

Another key element in improving the timeliness--and indeed quality--of our product is clearly understanding the policymaker's needs. We are doing this by getting our people into policymaking departments and agencies and into the military commands. Moreover, we have used a multioffice and agency team approach in more directly supporting our international negotiating teams with tactical, real-time intelligence support. Our success in these endeavors has been unprecedented. We have over 50 officers on rotation in the policymaking community and military commands, providing us first-hand access to their thinking and needs, ensuring the quick delivery of our product, and briefing our message when necessary.

Above and beyond this, we must continue at the Office and Division level to maintain solid contact with the policy community. Each Office and Center should know the critical makers and implementers of policy in its area and be working with and informing these people and staffs on a continuing basis. We have done a great deal, but more needs to be done.

In dealing with all of these changes, we must not lose sight of the importance of fostering expertise. We have always put great stock in our regional awareness, functional depth, and support capabilities. The turbulence following the relative stability of the Cold War has placed an even greater need for a solid grasp of the cultural, historical, political, economic, and regional military forces that are pushing the societies and peoples in turmoil.

This is being reflected in our personnel policies

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There is no substitute for knowing, learning, producing, and enhancing language skills, from the local scene. This is an increasingly critical part of building expertise. Fully 25 percent of our officers have now served extensively overseas and this percentage will go up as we continue to build a more experienced and language-capable work force. We will also aggressively support military planners and commanders not only analytically but also through the deployment of personnel. Elsewhere we will build expertise and knowledge through our involvement in the DCI Centers. Indeed, we now have

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[] officers in the Nonproliferation Center, Counter-terrorism Center, Counternarcotics Center, Counterintelligence Center, and the Arms Control Intelligence Staff. Taken together, all of these efforts underscore the importance of pushing responsibility further down the chain of command and placing a greater importance on our managers to get maximum use from shrinking resources.

All of our efforts obviously are occurring against a backdrop of changing budget realities. Efforts to invest in analytical expertise are taking place at the same time that downsizing has put a premium on experienced producers. Likewise, budget cuts have put intense pressure on our support people who have to maintain and improve our technology with fewer and fewer resources. More broadly, many of our officers who have spent years of productive and valuable service are faced, because of shifting priorities and circumstances, with shrinking headroom and diminishing attention to areas and disciplines to which they have devoted a professional lifetime. We must understand and be attentive to the very real pain involved in these circumstances and see that justice is done for those who have served us so well. At the same time, we need to be especially rigorous in personnel evaluation so that, in this downsizing era, we promote and keep the very best of our people. We need to be extremely careful in our hiring policies to continue to acquire the broadest possible benefits of diversity in our workplace and build the most capable and diverse work force possible. As we respond to these circumstances, we also need to continue examining carefully those areas that can receive less attention. As a result, we need to work increasingly productively with other intelligence producers, particularly DIA, to avoid duplicative effort.

Looking ahead, we must keep in mind the long range payoff from our personnel policies. As our officers in the field return, our capabilities will be enormously enhanced. Their contacts will last a professional lifetime and will make future access to agencies and officials immeasurably easier. We will far better understand the capabilities and limitations of embassies and stations. Our supply of language-capable officers will increase and enrich our analysis. We will have built-in the capability to maintain our quality improvement on a steady, upward curve for the foreseeable future.

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